We examine how exogenous increases in foreign competition affect firms' earnings management behavior, using import tariff reductions as a natural experiment. Using a Difference-inDifferences framework, we find a significant increase in earnings management after tariff reductions that intensify foreign competition. By showing that affected firms engage in greater earnings management, we find evidence of a "dark side" to competition and unintended consequences of trade liberalization. We further document that the effect of tariff reductions on earnings management is more pronounced for firms operating in industries that are more competitive before the tariff reductions (and therefore subject to greater predation risk), for firms that are subject to tighter financial constraints (which inhibit their "real" response to foreign competition), and for firms subject to weaker external monitoring. Our findings are consistent with Shleifer (2004), who argues that competition might induce more unethical behavior (such as earnings management).
Introduction
Following a series of accounting scandals and failures of corporate governance in the last few decades, the issue of earnings quality has been the focus of regulatory authorities, financial reports users, and researchers. As a typical agency problem, the incentives for managers to "cook the books" have been frequently discussed (Dechow et al., 2010) . Specifically, earnings management serves as an effective tool for misrepresenting economic performance, concealing unfavorable earnings realizations, and avoiding the scrutiny and interference from outside investors.
Previous literature, however, largely treats firms as isolated organizations and discusses how cross-sectional heterogeneity determines firms' involvement in earnings management. The role of product market competition in firms' financial reporting practices has generally been overlooked. One factor that impedes the establishment of causal relationship is the endogeneity of competitive pressures and financial reporting policies. Our paper, using import tariff reductions in U.S. manufacturing industries as a natural experiment, fills this gap by showing how, and through which channels, exogenously intensified competition from foreign rivals shapes firms' engagement in earnings management. 1 In addition, this unique setting also allows us to document how incumbent firms' financial policies respond to trade liberalization.
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The theoretical literature offers competing views about the impact of product markets on corporate earnings management. On the one hand, intensified competition caused by trade liberalization could discipline managers and curtail earnings management. It is widely documented in the literature that agency conflicts caused by the separation between ownership and control create incentives for managers or corporate insiders to misrepresent economic 1 The literature on trade liberalization has documented a significant increase in competitive pressure from foreign rivals following the reduction in trade barriers. See, for example, Bernard et al. (2007) and Tybout (2003) .
2 Previous literature has documented the positive effect of trade liberalization on firms' economic activities and shown that import tariff reductions enhance firms' productivity and promotes economic prosperity. See, for instance, Pavcnik (2002) , Schor (2004), and Bustos (2011). performance and conceal private benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stein, 1989; Dechow et al., 2010) . As pointed out in the literature, product market competition can serve as an external disciplinary (or governance) mechanism to help align the interests of the managers with shareholders, provide an easier assessment of firm performance relative to peers, reduce managerial slack, and generally curb managerial misbehavior (e.g. Hart, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Schmidt, 1997; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Meyer and Vickers, 1997) . It follows that heightened competition caused by trade liberalization may alleviate agency costs and reduce earnings management incentives.
Furthermore, heightened competition increases the firm's concerns about potential predation: the risk of losing investment opportunities and market share to product market rivals (Froot et al., 1993) . As documented in the literature (e.g. Hibar and Jenkins, 2004; Graham et al., 2008) , corporate misreporting can result in negative and significant stock market reactions (e.g. Palmrose et al., 2004 ) and a dramatic increase in the cost of equity and cost of debt. 3 Moreover, the reputational loss caused by exposed corporate misreporting might also affect the firm's clients and suppliers, and change the terms on which they do business with the firm (Graham et al., 2008) . All these potential effects can intensify predation risk, especially during periods of trade liberalization. In sum, the heightened competition caused by trade liberalization increases firms' exposure to predation risks, makes corporate misreporting more costly and, as a consequence, may further diminish earnings management incentives.
On the other hand, intensified competition caused by trade liberalization might lead to more earnings management. In an influential paper, Shleifer (2004) points out a potential "dark side"
of competition, and argues that intensified competition might lead to the spread of unethical behavior (such as earnings management). Increased intensity in product market competition results in loss of market share, lower market power, and lower profitability. Corporate managers have strong incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid earning decreases and losses, because reporting lower than expected earnings is severely penalized by financial markets (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 2005) . For firms with weak pricing power (e.g. firms in competitive markets), it is very difficult to pass on increased costs to their customers. As a consequence, firms in competitive markets may be more likely to manipulate earnings to avoid reported losses or earnings declines and to meet market expectations. Furthermore, because firms have an incentive to strategically limit (or obfuscate) the disclosure of information that could be subsequently used against it by rivals (Verrecchia, 1983; Darrough, 1993) , they may have stronger incentives to manage earnings to limit information flows to their rivals and potential entrants when competitive pressures increase. For both these reasons, increased intensity in product market competition can result in more earnings management.
As the theoretical literature offers competing views, the link between market competition and earnings management is an empirical question. The existing literature, however, provides little direct evidence on how competition shapes firms' financial reporting policies (Healy and Palepu, 2001) . One important reason for this gap in the literature is the endogenous relation between financial reporting practices and the competitive nature of an industry. Firstly, unobservable cross-section heterogeneity could be associated both with firms' earnings management choices and product market competition, leading to a spurious conclusion about how competition shapes firms' choices in manipulating their earnings. Secondly, reverse causality potentially exists, because manipulated earnings could either attract new entrants into a market with high profitability or deter new entrants given the strong financial position of the existing firms. In this paper, we overcome these endogeneity issues by using a natural, exogenous experiment: examining the impact of a reduction in import tariffs on firms' earnings manipulation.
The last few decades have witnessed a trend of U.S. regulatory authorities gradually removing trade obstacles. The lowering of trade barriers has substantially reduced import tariff rates on a variety of goods (Andersen and Van Wincoop, 2004) . As an example, the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) came into force in 1989 and removed trade barriers between the U.S. and Canada (Trefler, 2004; Bernard et al, 2007) . The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 further reduced tariff rates between the U.S. and Mexico.
Intuitively, for individual firms based in the U.S. the result of these reductions in trade barriers is an exogenous increase in competition from foreign rivals. The reductions of import tariff rates in the U.S. not only create exogenous shocks to foreign competition, but also solve the omitted variable problem that could compromise our results; examining import tariff rate reductions allows for multiple shocks to different firms at different points in time.
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Employing annual import tariff data for U.S. manufacturing industries, we carefully identify 49 significant tariff reductions between 1990 and 2003 in 44 unique three-digit SIC industries, affecting approximately 745 to 850 firms (depending on other data constraints). On average, the magnitude of the tariff reductions represents 28% of the tariff rates before the cuts. Therefore, these tariff reductions represent exogenous shocks that dramatically change the competitive landscape of the related sectors. We first compare the differences in earnings management for treated and untreated firms before and after the reductions in import tariffs. After finding that the difference in the change of earnings management for the two groups is substantial, we begin our analysis by running Difference-in-Differences regressions to control for a set of explanatory variables that are expected to be associated with firms' financial reporting policies. To refine our study, we next adopt a Difference-in-Differences approach that matches treatment firms with control firms based on average size, Tobin's Q, market leverage, and asset growth rates in the two years prior to the tariff rate reductions. This approach mitigates the impact of unobservable cross-sectional or time-series effects that could affect both market competition and earnings management. Our results are robust to this refinement.
We measure the magnitude of earnings management using three approaches drawn from the existing literature. We use the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated from the Modified Jones' Model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny, 1995) , the original Jones' Model (Jones, 1991) , and the TWW Model (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998) . From all these models, we take the average of the absolute value discretionary accruals for the two-year periods prior to and after the tariff-reduction events. All of the three measures generate the consistent conclusion that intensified product market competition from foreign rivals leads to greater earnings management by U.S. public firms. More specifically, we find that the treated firms almost double the absolute value of their discretionary accruals after the cut in tariff rates according to the Difference-inDifferences matching results. Specifically, the treatment firms respond to the tariff cuts by increasing the absolute value of discretionary accrual by 8.1% of the total assets relative to the control firms. These results are robust to a battery of matching combinations, with only slight fluctuations in magnitudes.
A careful investigation of the mechanisms through which a tariff reduction affects firms' engagement in earnings management enhances the creditability of the causal relation we have uncovered. We therefore further explore the factors that could exacerbate or mitigate the unintended consequences of import tariff cuts. Since we have built our story on predation risk, a natural step is to examine the impact of trade liberalization on earnings management conditional on the exposure to such risk. To measure firms' vulnerability to predation by foreign rivals, we first focus on the product market competiveness of the incumbent firms. Competitive industries imply lower entry barriers, facilitating the entrance of foreign rivals. 5 At the same time, individual firms operating in competitive industries have lower market share, which makes them potentially more vulnerable to strong foreign rivals. Therefore, an equivalent level of tariff rate reduction in a competitive industry implies greater predation risk than the same tariff shock in a 5 According to Bain (1993) , anything that allows incumbents to earn abnormal profits forms an entry barrier. Abnormal profits in competitive industries tend to be lower (or zero) and, therefore, such industries have lower barriers to entry compared to concentrated industries. concentrated industry. In addition, we look at the individual firms' market share. Firms with low market share have stronger incentives to engage in earnings management since they do not have a large "buffer" of profitability to protect them from losses. Consistent with our expectations, we find the unintended consequences of trade liberalization to be more pronounced in competitive industries and for firms with low market share.
We then investigate the impact of financial constraints on the earnings-management The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the validity of the natural experiment, the construction of our measures of earnings management, and our identification strategies. Section 3 reports our results using Difference-in-Differences regressions and a Difference-in-Differences matching estimator. Section 4 discusses how competitive position determines the reaction from the treated firms to the exogenous shock, while Section 5 examines the influences of financial constraints on the relation between increased foreign competition and firms' earnings management. The role of external monitoring from institutional investors and stock analysts is discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
The setting and data
This section discusses our identification strategies in using import tariff reductions as a natural experiment for increased foreign competition, and describes the sample. We then introduce the construction of measures for earnings management.
The setting
Extant literature on the impact of product market competition on firms' disclosure practices mainly focuses on the proprietary cost hypothesis, which examines the relationship between product market competition and voluntary disclosure. As pointed out by Healy and Palepu we calculate ad valorem tariff rate as the duties collected by U.S. custom divided by the Free-onBoard value of imports. To make sure the reduction is substantial, we define a shock to import tariffs in year t if the reduction is greater than the median reduction (both in absolute value) in the same industry over the whole sample period. We exclude tariff reductions if they are followed by equivalently large increase in tariffs over the next two years to ensure that the tariff reductions are non-transitory. We also exclude events if the ex-ante tariff rates were smaller than 1% (as import restrictions in these industries were likely minimal ex-ante).
Measures of accrual-based earnings management
We construct earnings management measures using data from the Compustat North American Fundamental Annual Database. Only firms with three-digit SIC codes between 200
and 399 (i.e., manufacturing firms; Division D of the SIC code manual published by the U.S.
Department of Labor) are included in our sample.
We rely on three measures for financial reporting quality, EM_MJ, EM_J, and EM_TWW.
We construct EM_MJ using the Modified Jones' model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995) and EM_J following Jones (1991). Specifically, for each two-digit SIC industry each year, we estimate discretionary accruals in the cross section by firstly running the following regression using all sample firms with at least 15 observations:
where TA is the total accruals of firm i in year t, calculated as ΔData4-ΔData1-ΔData5+ΔData34-Data14 (Compustat data items). PPE refers to property, plant, and equipment.
To construct EM_MJ, we estimate the normal accrual level (NA) for each firm with the coefficients obtained from the above regression using the equation below:
of earnings management (or financial reporting quality), EM_MJ, as the absolute value of difference between total accruals and the predicted firm-level normal accruals (abnormal accruals), scaled by lagged total assets.
Following Jones (1991), we calculate EM_J as the absolute value of the residual term obtained from regression (1).
Following Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), we construct EM_TWW by first running the following regression for each two-digit SIC industry each year using all sample firms with at least 15 observations:
We then then estimate the normal accrual level (NA) for each firm with the coefficients obtained from the above regression according to the equation below:
where ΔAR is the change in accounts receivable for firm i in year t. Then we define our measure of financial reporting quality, EM_TWW as the absolute value of difference between total accruals and the predicted firm-level normal accruals (abnormal accruals).
Validity of tariff reductions as a natural experiment
The creditability of our study lies in the exogeneity of industry-level tariff reductions. If U.S.
authorities decide whether (or not) to reduce import tariffs in one particular industry conditional on the reported profitability driven by earnings management of firms in that industry, the cut in tariffs would not be exogenous to the reporting policy choice. In other words, if reserve causality exists, our natural experiment would be invalid. In this section, we address this concern by
showing that the level of earnings management is not a determinant of the incidence of tariff rate reductions.
To be specific, we run a Probit regression with an indicator variable for whether the threedigit SIC industry has experienced a shock to import tariffs (defined in Section 2.1) in year t. For our main independent variables of interest, we construct the lagged average EM_MJ, EM_J, and EM_TWW for every three-digit SIC industry. Each of the three measures serves as an independent variable in each Probit regression, respectively. In addition to industry-level earnings management, we also control for a set of lagged industry-average characteristics: tariff rates, size, market leverage, return on assets (ROA), Tobin's Q, cash flow, and asset growth.
Year fixed effects are included in every regression. We report the marginal effects from these regressions in Panel B of Table 1 .
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[Insert Table 1 about here]
The results mitigate concerns about the validity of tariff reductions as a natural experiment.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the results with industry-average lagged EM_MJ, EM_J, and EM_TWW as main independent variables, respectively. The coefficients on the industry-level earnings management measures are all insignificantly different from zero, indicating that the average earnings management level in a three-digit SIC industry in year t-1 is not associated with a shock tariff reduction in the same industry in the next year. In addition, we find consistent tariff reduction determinants in all of our three regressions, i.e. lagged tariff rates (higher-rate industries are more likely to experience reductions), size (industries with larger firms are less likely to experience tariff reductions, potentially because of lobbying power), and cash flow (high average cash flow in the industry appears to be positively associated with trade liberalization).
Sample construction
After verifying the validity of industry-level tariff reductions as a natural experiment for our study on the connection between competition and firms' financial reporting practices, we construct our sample to only include shock import tariff reductions with no other reductions in the two years before and after the shock. In other words, we define treated industry-years by requiring a greater-than-median ("shock") tariff reduction in year t and no other tariff reductions and 399) that do not experience a shock tariff reduction at any point during our sample period are defined as untreated industries, which we then match by year to the treated industries described above (and only keep untreated industry-years in the sample if they match (by year) to a treated industry-year).
We merge this industry-year data with our data on individual firms' earnings management.
For each firm-year in the resulting sample, we calculate the average of our earnings-management metrics (EM_MJ, EM_J, and EM_TWW) in the two years before and after the specific firm-year.
The difference in these pre-and post-event averages (although only the treated firms actually experience the event) is our main variable of interest in the remainder of this paper. These variables all end with "DIF".
Before any other data screening, our sample for EM_MJ and EM_J contains 13,558 unique firm-year observations from 3,133 publicly traded U.S. manufacturing firms. Again, only some of these firm-years actually experience the event in question: specifically, 924 firm-years in this full sample. 6 The corresponding EM_TWW sample contains 13,564 unique firm-years from 3,147 publicly traded U.S. manufacturing firms. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for this sample. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the EM_MJ and EM_J sample, while Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the EM_TWW sample. All of the variables are winsorized at 1%
and 99% level, and all variables (other than the earnings management measures) are for the specific firm-year.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Empirical Results

Empirical strategy
We begin our analysis by examining the effect of large import tariff reductions on differences in the three earnings management measures for the full sample. If the "dark side" of foreign competition exists, we should find an increase in our measures for earnings management for the firms in treated industries compared to the firms in untreated industries. On the contrary, if product market competition helps mitigate agency problems, relative to untreated firms, impacted firms should be more conservative in their reporting choices and we should observe an improvement in financial reporting quality (i.e., a decrease in our measures of earnings management). Specifically, we run Difference-in-Differences regressions to evaluate the changes in earnings management in the treated group relative to the untreated group, controlling for several fundamental firm characteristics and cross-sectional heterogeneity.
Next, we employ a more refined approach, the Difference-in-Differences matching estimator (ATT estimator) as described in Abadie and Imbens (2006) . We find the nearest nontreated neighbor for each of our treated firms based on our selected criteria. To be specific, for each firm-year in a treated industry we find a firm (the nearest neighbor) in an untreated industry in the same year based on matching by average size, leverage, Tobin's Q, and asset growth in the two prior fiscal years. Then we compare the difference-in-differences of earnings management proxies for the treated firms and these matched (untreated) firms. By taking the average of difference-in-differences across all firms, we obtain the average treatment effect of an import tariff reduction on earnings management.
The impact of trade liberalization on earnings management: regression analysis
We use the change in earnings management measures as the dependent variable and run full-sample regressions with firms experiencing shock tariff rate cuts as the treated group and firms with no events as the control group. Specifically, we estimate the following model with EM_MJ_DIF, EM_J_DIF, and EM_TWW_DIF as dependent variables, respectively: ,
In this regression, we control for year fixed effects ( ) and three-digit SIC industry fixed effects ( ), and a set of variables ( ) that are documented in previous literature to affect the level of earnings management. Specifically we control for size, market leverage, Tobin's Q, asset growth, cash flow, ROA, and cash flow volatility (see Dechow et al., 2010; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Yu, 2008) .
The empirical results are reported in Table 3 . Column (1) presents the regression results with EM_MJ_DIF (the difference between the earnings management proxy from the Modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995) after and before the event year) as the dependent variable. The significantly positive coefficient on the Treated indicator variable is consistent with the hypothesis that intensified foreign competition leads to more earnings management. Relative to untreated firms, treated firms increase EM_MJ by an additional 0.138 (difference-in-differences) in the two years following a shock tariff reduction, significant at 1%
level. Given that the mean of the EM_MJ measure is 0.199 in the two years prior to the event (Table 2) , this implies an increase of 69% from the sample mean. Columns (2) and (3) reveal consistent results using the alternative earnings management proxies as dependent variables (EM_J and EM_TWW, respectively). Using EM_J as the dependent variable, the increase of EM_J in treated firms is 0.149 higher than that in untreated firms, ceteris paribus. And the increase of EM_TWW in treated firms is 0.117 higher than that in untreated firms. Given that the mean of EM_J and EM_TWW are 0.2 and 0.1, respectively, this differential increase for firms that are exposed to an exogenous increase in foreign competition (from a substantial decrease in import tariffs) is not only statistically significant but also economically significant.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The impact of trade liberalization on earnings management: Difference-in-differences matching estimators (ATT)
Our regression results imply that intensified foreign competition appears to be associated with a propensity for impacted firms to manipulate their earnings more aggressively. To ensure this effect is not driven by cross-sectional differences amongst firms, we employ a Difference-indifferences matching estimator (ATT) approach to establish a more precise estimate of the effect.
The Difference-in-differences matching estimator approach ensures that our treated and control firms are fundamentally similar except for the substantial decrease in tariff rates that our treatment firms are exposed to. In other words, this approach employs a more focused set of untreated firms (that are similar along many dimensions to the treated firms) than used in the full-sample regressions represented in Table 3 .
Matching dimensions: balance test
To find the comparable (untreated) control firm for each of our treated firms, we match our firms along four dimensions in two years prior to the reduction: average size, Tobin's Q, market leverage, and asset growth rate.
Excluding observations from our sample with missing values for any of the matching criterion, we are left with 839 treated firms for the EM_MJ and EM_J sample, and 843 treated firms for EM_TWW sample. To verify our matching process, we test the median and distribution (using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) for each matching dimension. As reported in Table 4 , all of our matching variables are insignificantly different for the treated group compared to the control group. Panel A shows the results for the EM_MJ and EM_J sample and Panel B shows the results for EM_TWW sample.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Main results and alternative matching methods
After confirming that our treated and control firms are properly matched, we now present the main matching results for our three earnings management measures. The first rows in the three panels (A, B, and C) of Table 5 and is reported in Panel C. Although the economic magnitude of the ATT estimate is somewhat smaller than that in the regression analysis (which indicated a difference-in-differences of about 0.14), the ATT-estimated effect of tariff reductions on earnings management remains economically significant. Using EM_J as an example, a 0.088 increase in EM_J represents a 44% increase relative to the (unconditional) sample mean.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
To ensure that our empirical findings are not sensitive to the matching criteria, we further match each of the treated firms with its nearest neighbor in the untreated sample according to a set of alternative matching criteria. Specifically, we employ different combinations of matching criteria from size, Tobin's Q, market leverage, asset growth rate, sales growth rate, cash flow, cash flow volatility, and profitability (ROA). These different matching criteria create variation in the sample size of treated group, as shown in Table 5 . For example, the calculation of cash flow volatility requires five-years of cash flow data, reducing our sample size to 745 for the EM_MJ and EM_J sample and to 753 for the EM_TWW sample. The matching results are presented below the main matching results in each panel in Table 5 . All of our matching methods yield highly consistent and robust empirical results.
The impact of import tariff reduction on earnings management: predation risk
In this section we carefully investigate the underlying mechanisms through which tariff reductions impact firms' earnings management behavior. As we have built our argument on predation risk, it is natural to compare the changes in earnings management behavior between firms with different levels of exposure to such risk. To be specific, we use firms' competitive positions in product markets and capital markets to measure their vulnerability to predation from (foreign) rivals.
Product market competitiveness
We examine whether the impact of tariff reductions on firms' earnings management behavior is stronger for firms with weak competitive positions in product markets. Specifically,
we examine the earnings management responses to tariff reductions conditional on industry competitiveness (Herfindal-Hirschman Index, HHI) and the market shares of impacted firms.
Intuitively, firms operating in competitive industries have lower market share, which makes them potentially more vulnerable to strong foreign rivals. Consequently, an equivalent level of tariff rate reduction in a competitive industry implies greater predation risk than that in a concentrated industry. To capture variation in industry competitiveness, we split our sample into two subsamples according to the pre-event level of the HHI for each two-digit SIC industry. We construct the HHI with both sales and asset shares. Specifically, for each industry j in year t, we use the sales-based market share to construct HHI according to equation (8):
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For each industry j in year t, we also construct the HHI with asset shares as follows: [Insert Table 6 about here] We further investigate firm-level competitiveness to fully capture individual (as opposed to industry) exposure to the shock of trade liberalization. As widely documented in the literature, intensified foreign competition leads to shrinking market share and decreasing profitability.
Firms with poor competitive position have less "buffer" to protect them from these losses. If the predation risk argument is correct, the unintended consequences of tariff reduction should naturally be more pronounced in firms with competitive disadvantages. To test this hypothesis, we split the sample according to the market share of the firm. Low market share implies greater vulnerability to strong foreign competitors. We show the matching estimator (ATT) conditional on the market share of the treated firms prior to the events in Table 6 . Consistent with our expectation, our matching results show that firms with disadvantageous competitive positions tend to engage in more financial reporting manipulation following large reductions in important tariffs. The low market share subsample has an ATT of 0.166 (t-stat 3.38) for EM_MJ, an ATT of 0.187 (t-stat 3.75) for EM_J, and an ATT of 0.183 (t-stat 6.31) for EM_TWW. Contrary to the significant ATTs in low market share group, firms in the high market share subsample show no significant evidence of increased earnings manipulation (relative to control firms) for any of our measures.
Our analysis reveals that firms operating in competitive industries, or firms with low market share, respond to tariff reductions by engaging in more aggressive earnings management than those in concentrated industries or those with high market share. The former firms are more vulnerable to the heightened foreign competitive pressure. The evidence we document lends support to the argument that the predation risk induced by tariff reductions motivates incumbent firms to embellish their financial reports and obfuscate true economic performance.
Financial constraints
We also investigate the role of financial constraints in shaping the impact of tariff reductions on firms' earnings management. Tighter financial constraints imply limited access to external financing and difficulty in funding positive NPV projects to gain advantages over potential or actual competitors (Campello, 2006) . In addition, financially constrained firms are more vulnerable to the aggressive pricing and production strategies adopted by their competitors.
Consequently, we would expect that firms with greater financial constraints face greater predation risk when exposed to exogenous increases in foreign competition (via tariff reductions).
To test this prediction, we divide the sample into low and high financial constraint subsamples, 
where Size equals the log of inflation-adjusted book assets (capped at the log of $4.5 billion) and
Age is the number of years the firm is listed with a non-missing stock price data in Compustat (winsorized at thirty-seven years). A firm falls into the high financial constraint subsample if its HP index is higher than the median of the HP index in our sample of treated firms.
The first two columns in Table 7 We construct the WW index as in Whited and Wu (2006): , (11) where CF is operating cash flow and AT is total assets. Dividend is an indicator equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends in the year and zero otherwise. Leverage is measured as total debt divided by total assets. Industry sales growth is the average sales growth of all firms in the threedigit SIC industry to which the firm belongs. Firms with a WW index above median are categorized as having high financial constraints.
The third and fourth columns in Table 7 display the ATT matching results partitioned by the level of the WW index. Consistent with the first two columns in Table 7 (based on the HP Index), we find that treated firms in the high WW index subsample increase their earnings management to a larger extent than their matched peers. For example, the ATT for EM_MJ in high WW Index subsample is 0.186 (t-stat 4.18), while the corresponding ATT in low WW index subsample is -0.017 (t-stat -0.51). Results for EM_J and EM_TWW are similar to those in the first two columns of the table.
Instead of relying entirely on these two indices, we also use indicators for specific corporate policies in year t-1 to infer the financial condition of treated firms. Firms paying dividends are less likely to be financially constrained (Dennis and Sibilkov, 2010) . Dividend is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm pays dividends in year t-1, and zero otherwise. Firms that do not pay dividends are potentially financially constrained. Consistent with the results that we obtain using indices as proxies for financial constraints, the ATT estimates differ substantially for treated firms that pay dividends in the year prior to the tariff reductions compared to those that do not. For firms that do not pay dividends in year t-1 (constrained firms, by this metric), the matching estimator (ATT) ranges from 0.141 to 0.151, depending on the earnings management measure we use. All of the three matching estimators are significant at 1% level. For firms that pay dividends in year t-1 (unconstrained firms), we obtain insignificant results for EM_MJ and EM_J while a small (0.036) but significant (t-stat 2.75) ATT for EM_TWW. Despite the statistical significance, the economic magnitude is much smaller relative to the ATT (0.141) for firms that do not pay dividends in year t-1.
Firms with bond ratings have easier access to external financing than firms without bond ratings (Denis and Sibikov, 2010). Thus firms without bond ratings are likely more financially constrained. The last two columns in Table 7 at the 10% level using EM_TWW, but the economic significance of that coefficient is small).
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Our results suggest that intensified competition from foreign rivals provokes a more powerful earnings management response for firms with tighter financial constraints. High financial constraints limit a firm's access to external finance, and lead to foregone positive NPV projects and potential disadvantages in a price war against foreign competitors. Consequently, financially constrained firms have greater incentives to manipulate their reported earnings to partially shelter them from the predation risk induced by tariff reductions.
The impact of import tariff reduction on earnings management: monitoring
Our previous analyses indicate that competitive pressures from import tariff reductions are associated with more earnings management, especially for firms that are most sensitive to increases in competition. As a typical agency problem, earnings management allows managers to manipulate investors' belief and extract personal benefits by obfuscating true economic performance. However, if such unethical behavior could easily be discovered by outside monitoring mechanisms, managers' incentive to manipulate the earnings would be attenuated.
Thus, we expect the earnings management response to tariff reductions to be less aggressive in firms exposed to stronger external monitoring. We use analyst coverage and institutional ownership to capture the variation in external monitoring.
Documented by Yu (2008) , stock analysts play an active role in mitigating managers' incentive to manipulate financial reports. Analysts increase the probability of being detected manipulating earnings, and a negative analyst report implies severe punishment in the stock market. Thus we would expect the unintended consequences of tariff reductions to be more pronounced in firms with no analyst following. In Table 8 , we split our sample according to whether the firm is followed by at least one analyst in the year of the tariff reduction. The first two columns in Table 8 The presence of sophisticated institutional investors also implies higher costs of distorting real economic performance via earnings manipulation. Institutional investors are more likely to be able to detect earnings management, and could "vote with their feet" to show their dissatisfaction towards poor corporate governance (implying stock market punishment for the distorting firm). We therefore expect the negative side of intensified foreign competition to be stronger in firms with low institutional ownership. To test this hypothesis, we categorize treated firms into high and low institutional ownership groups. If the firm has institutional ownership higher than the median in the treated sample, it falls in the high institutional ownership group.
Otherwise, it belongs to low institutional ownership group.
The last two columns in Table 8 
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Conclusions
Using import tariff reductions as a natural experiment and focusing on earnings management behavior, we investigate how U.S. manufacturing firms react to heightened competitive pressures from foreign rivals. Relying on three measures of earnings manipulation, we find consistent results that exogenously intensified foreign competition (via tariff reductions) leads to more aggressive earnings management in the impacted firms. These results are robust to various identification strategies including Difference-in-differences regressions and Differencein-differences matching estimators. By revealing that intensified product market competition potentially promotes unethical behavior in obfuscating true economic performance, we lend support to the "dark side of competition" story proposed in Shleifer (2004) , and highlight unintended consequences of trade liberalization.
More importantly, we identify mechanisms through which tariff reductions influence incumbent firms' earnings management. We show that perceived predation risk appears to drive firms to distort their economic performance. Firms with poor product market competitiveness or with tighter financial constraints (that have less of a "buffer" against heightened foreign competition) are more exposed to predation risks. We find strong empirical evidence that these kinds of firms (operating in competitive industries, firms with low market share, and firms with tight financial constraints) distort their economic performance following exogenous cuts in tariff rates more aggressively than those with a strong "competitive buffer." Our analysis also shows that firms with analysts following and firms with high institutional ownership are more conservative in manipulating their earnings, an indication that these characteristics help attenuate the agency costs that are likely responsible for earnings manipulation.
Our study illuminates the relation between earnings management and competition from a novel and comprehensive perspective. By showing that firms increase their earnings manipulation when there is a substantial increase in foreign competition, we support the hypothesis that there is a "dark side" to product market competition. Our evidence reveals that product market competition potentially aggravates agency problems, and promotes the spread of unethical behavior. Our paper also adds to a growing literature on the effect of trade This table reports the marginal effects from Probit regression models (Panel B) designed to test the validity of the usage of import tariff reductions as a natural experiment to explore the relation between intensified foreign competition and earnings management. We examine the effect of lagged industry-average earnings management measures on the incidence of industry-level tariff reductions between 1989 and 2005. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the three-digit industry experiences a reduction in import tariffs that is greater than the median reduction (for the same industry over the whole sample period) in the year in question, and zero otherwise. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and within-industry error clustering, and the standard errors are reported in brackets. All the independent variables are averaged at the three-digit industry level and definitions are given in Appendix A. Panel A contains summary statistics for these industry-year variables. In Panel B, *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table 2 Summary Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for our measures of earnings management, firm characteristics, and control variables for the sample used in the regression analysis. We construct three variables to measure financial reporting quality for a firm, following Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995 ), Jones (1991 ), and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998 . For each measure of financial reporting quality, we take the two-year average before and after the tariff reduction for our sample firms to estimate the pre-and post-event level of earnings management. The variables EM_MJ (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) , EM_J (Jones, 1991), and EM_TWW (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998) Table 7 Difference-in-Differences of Earnings Management before and after Tariff Reductions: Partitioned by Financial Constraints 
